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REVIEWS
THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT*
Does a court in the United States have the inherent power,
without a jury trial, to punish a stranger, by fine and imprisonment, for an indirect contempt of court?
Many state and the Federal courts have held that this is not
only a power given to them, but that it is an inherent power
which cannot be taken away from them by another branch of
the government 1 and the Indiana Supreme Court has recently
held that the courts have this power even where there is no case
pending; 2 but Sir John Fox has shown conclusively in his exploration of the antiquities of contempt, that this is a fallacious
doctrine, because it is in violation of the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury, since this power of the courts was not established at the common law when that guarantee was adopted
in the United States. The existing law upon the subject all
rests upon Justice Wilmot's unsupported statement in the extralegal case of The King v. Almon 3 that "the jurisdiction is as
ancient as any other part of the common law" and the perpetuation of the error by Wilmot's friend, Blackstone. 4 The opinion
in this case was written in 1765, but it was never delivered because the proceedings were entitled "The King v. Wilkes" instead of "The Kig v. Almon'" and the proceedings had to be
abandoned. The opinion was concealed until 1802 and was first
cited in 1811 and was never followed until 1821.
Sir John Fox shows that attachment as a process by which a
man was brought up for trial stands on immemorial usage
(Hen. II), but that attachment followed by examination in* The History of Contempt of Court. The Form of Trial and the Mode
of Punishment. By Sir John Fox. The Clarendon Press, Oxford.
Pp. xxiii, 252. 1927. Price $2.75.
1 State v. Morrill, (1855) 16 Ark. 384; Little v. State, (1883) 90 Ind.
338; State v. Frew and Hart, (1884) 24 W. Va. 416; Bradley v. State,
(1900) 111 Ga. 168; Carter v. Commonwealth, (1899) 96 Va. 791; State v.
Shepherd, (1903) 177 Mo. 205; Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States,
(1918) 247 U. S. 402; Craig v. Hecht, (1923) 263 U. S. 255. See on this
subject Frankfurter and Landis, Power to Regulate Contempt (1924), 37
Harv. L. Rev.; and Willis, Punishment for Contempt of Court, 2 Ind. Law.
J. 309.
2 State v. Shumaker, (1927) 157 N. E. 769. See Comments, 14 Va. L.
Rev. 227; 26 Mich. L. Rev. 440; 41 Hary. L. Rev. 254. Of course where
there is no case pending the question is not so much whether a person
should be punished for contempt without a jury trial as whether he should
be punished at all-a very different question. Patterson v. Colorado,
(1907) 205 U. S.454.
3 First published in 1802 in Wilmot, Notes and Opinions of Judgments,
243 ff.
4 Blackstone's Commentaries, IV, pp. 283-288.
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stead of trial does not. The practice of examination was derived from the Ecclesiastical Courts; prevailed in the Council
in the 14th century; and was reproduced in the Court of Chancery in civil cases and in the Star Chamber in criminal cases.
Down to the 16th Century criminal contempts out of court by
strangers were, like trespass, tried either by jury or in the
Star Chamber (though contempts in the actual view of the court
and by officers were punished summarily). Upon the abolition
of the Star Chamber in 1641 libels on the court were tried by
information down to 1721. Hence there was still recognized the
distinction between contempt in court and contempt out of court.
But in that year a stranger was tried for libel by attachment
and examination, and by 1821 summary process without jury
was established as regular practice. Thus fifty-six years after
Almon's case the high-handed attempt of the common law
judges of the Stuart Restoration to take over the summary inquisitorial procedure of the Star Chamber resulted, in contempt
cases, in a success that the Stuart judges themselves could not
accomplish. 5 Since Almon's case did not become law in England
until 1821,6 it was after the establishment of the United States
Constitution and constitutional bills of rights generally. If
prior to that time the English courts had not punished for indirect contempt by attachment and examination but only by
information and jury trial, this power could not have become
an inherent power of the courts prior to the adoption of our
state and federal constitutions with their guarantee of jury trial
and doctrine of separation of powers, and under the usual rules
of construction would never become an inherent power.
Yet eourts in the 'United States, misinformed, have erroneously held that it is a power and such an inherent power that
under the doctrine of separation of powers it cannot be taken
away from the courts by legislation. So that now, without constitutional amendment or the voluntary abandonment of the
practice by the courts themselves, it is impossible to prevent a
court from being party, judge, evidence, and jury in its own
case where the only contempt is some act done not in the presence of the court but at a distance.
Sir John Fox has done a fine piece of work in showing how our
courts have gone astray and how there is no substantial basis
for the power now exercised by them, but it is to be feared that
his work is a work of supererogation and has come too late to
accomplish any reform. Lovers of truth, however, will enjoy
5 Amercement was introduced by William the Conqueror in place of the
Anglo-Saxon wite. According to the old law before the 17th Century a
person punished for contempt was imprisoned but discharged on the payment of a fine and it was only after the 17th Century that a person was

punished in case of contempt both by imprisonment and a fine and imprisoned until the fine was paid.
6 Even Lord Hardwicke, as Chancellor, Roach w. Garvan, (1742) 2 Ark.

469, did not succeed in establishing the practice as a regular thing.
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reading his invigorating book, and possibly some lover of justice
may some day win a great case on the strength of its historicity.
HUGH EVANDER WIILIS.

Indiana University School of Law.

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WILLS*
The first edition of Professor Rood's work was perhaps the
most popular textbook on Wills for many years after its publication in 1904. The present edition of this work involves some
extension in point of subject matter, but for the most part it
is the first edition over again with the added element of ample
citations to more recent cases and particular references to the
Lawyer's Reports Annotated, Ruling Case Law and other encyclopaedias and digests of the law. In some instances there
has been a re-writing of the original exposition, but for the
most part the sections in the present edition will correspond
pretty closely to those in the 1904 edition with the exception
of the added material in the footnotes and slight changes to
make the original text conform with recent developments in the
subject.
The reader should remember that the author in his preface to
both editions makes it clear that his purpose has been to write
a thorough and accurate work on the law of Wills in a single
volume, in which the subject would be so explained and documented that the book would be useful for practicing lawyers.
For more than twenty years the first edition of this work has
fulfilled this purpose; the reviewer thinks it likely that the
present edition will continue to do so and that it will be welcomed by the profession for its own merits and for the value
which full citations down to date now give to it.
The method of treatment is somewhat similar to the Hornbook method although the bold face type is much less than in
the Hornbook series. Thus for the most part Professor Rood
has not put more in the headings than a single statement or
single phrase while the text matter which follows under these
set forth the significance of this phrase as a part of the exposition of the law of Wills. In keeping with this plan the reader
will understand how natural it is for the author to quote some
word or phrase from a famous judicial exposition of a principle
in the law of Wills and then let his textual comment be an
explanation of the significance of that word or phrase in the law
itself. Thus in the treatment of Gifts Causa, Mortis we have
independent sections in exposition of the following words which
are placed at the head of the sections in quotation marks-* Treatise on the Law of Wills (including also Gifts Causa
Mortis and a summary of the law of Descent, Distribution and
Administration). Second edition by John R. Rood. Chicago:
Callaghan & Co., 1926. Pp. ix, 1112. Price $6.50.

